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Pertempuran Amiens, 8 Ogos-3 September 1918

Pertempuran Amiens, 8 Ogos-3 September 1918

Pertempuran Amiens, 8 Ogos-3 September 1918

Pertempuran Amiens, 8 Ogos-3 September 1918, sering dilihat sebagai titik perubahan di Front Barat (Perang Dunia Pertama). Separuh pertama tahun ini dikuasai oleh serangan Jerman, bermula dengan pertempuran kedua Somme (21 Mac-4 April 1918), yang telah mendorong Inggeris kembali hampir ke pinggiran Amiens, mewujudkan pertunjukan besar di Sekutu garisan.

Serangan balas Sekutu bermula semasa pertempuran kedua Marne (15 Julai-5 Ogos 1918). Ini menyaksikan kegagalan serangan terakhir Jerman dan serangan balas Franco-Amerika (Aisne-Marne Offensive, 18 Julai-5 Ogos) yang mendorong Jerman keluar dari Château-Thierry. Pada 24 Julai, semasa pertempuran ini sedang berlangsung, para panglima sekutu bertemu di Bombon untuk memutuskan apa yang harus dilakukan selanjutnya. Anggapan umum adalah bahawa perang akan berlanjutan hingga tahun 1919, tetapi Foch merancang satu siri serangan balas untuk tahun 1918. Tujuan awalnya adalah untuk mendorong orang Jerman keluar dari tiga orang yang canggung, di St. Mihiel, Château-Thierry dan Amiens. Sekiranya serangan ini berjalan lancar, maka serangan umum akan berlaku.

Sumbangan British dalam rancangan ini adalah pertempuran Amiens. Bahkan sebelum pertemuan di Bombon, Haig telah mengarahkan Jenderal Rawlinson, yang memimpin Tentera Keempat di sekitar Amiens, untuk bersiap-siap untuk menyerang orang yang menonjol. Rawlinson membuat rancangan untuk pertempuran tangki. Rawlinson mempunyai tentera pelbagai negara, dengan bahagian Amerika, Australia, Kanada dan Britain. Dia diberi 530 kereta kebal Inggeris dan 70 Perancis, yang mana 96 adalah tangki bekalan, 22 kapal pengangkut senjata dan 420 tangki pertempuran, termasuk 324 Mark Vs. Untuk tujuan serangan Amiens, Haig juga diberi kawalan Tentera Pertama Perancis (Debeny), di sebelah kanan kedudukan Inggeris. Lapan bahagian Perancis akan mengambil bahagian dalam serangan di Amiens.

Kunci rancangan Rawlinson adalah kejutan. Dia merancang serangan sepuluh divisi ke depan 10 mil (dengan orang Kanada dan Australia merupakan sebahagian besar infanteri). Adalah mustahak bahawa orang Jerman tidak mengesyaki apa yang akan terjadi - pengeboman balas Jerman yang tepat pada waktunya dapat menimbulkan korban yang melumpuhkan pada serangan Inggeris. Oleh itu, Rawlinson merancang untuk menyerang tanpa pengeboman artileri awal. Serangan itu akan dimulakan dengan kereta kebal, didukung oleh infanteri dan dilindungi oleh rentetan serangan. Artileri akan melepaskan tembakan pada waktu yang sama dengan tangki maju. Di sebelah kanan Tentera Pertama Perancis kekurangan kereta kebal. Untuk mengekalkan kejutan itu, Perancis akan memulai pengeboman artileri pada masa yang sama dengan serangan Inggeris, dan kemudian menindaklanjuti dengan infanteri mereka 45 minit kemudian.

Barisan Jerman dibela oleh dua puluh bahagian letih dari Tentera Kelapan Belas (von Hutier) dan Tentera Kedua (Marwitz). Dalam empat bulan sejak mereka menangkap yang menonjol, Jerman telah membuat sistem pertahanan yang kuat. Menurut Ludendorff, "front divisi sempit, artileri berlimpah, dan sistem parit disusun secara mendalam. Semua pengalaman yang diperoleh pada 18 Julai telah dilaksanakan ”.

Serangan itu bermula pada 8 Ogos. Dalam beberapa jam pertama pertempuran, enam bahagian Jerman runtuh. Seluruh unit mula menyerah. Ludendorff menyebut 8 Ogos sebagai "Hari Hitam Tentera Jerman". Pada penghujung hari, Sekutu telah maju sejauh sembilan batu di depan sepuluh batu. 16,000 tahanan ditangkap pada hari pertama.

Fasa pertama pertempuran berakhir pada 11 Ogos. Orang Jerman telah mundur ke garis yang mereka pegang sebelum pertempuran pertama Somme. Haig merasakan bahawa garis-garis ini terlalu kuat untuk menyerang tanpa pengeboman artileri yang betul - medan perang Somme yang lama adalah gurun kawah tempurung yang tidak sesuai untuk perang tank.

Sebaliknya, Haig melancarkan serangan kedua di utara, menggunakan Tentera Ketiga (Byng) dan sebahagian dari Tentera Pertama (Horne). Tujuan serangan ini, yang dikenal sebagai pertempuran Bapaume, adalah untuk memaksa orang Jerman kembali ke garis Somme. Serangan ini bermula pada 21 Ogos. Setelah melakukan serangan balas Jerman pada 22 Ogos, kemajuan Inggeris memaksa Jerman untuk berundur ke Somme. Serangan itu berkembang merangkumi Tentera Pertama dan Keempat, sementara Perancis meneruskan serangan mereka sendiri ke selatan.

Pada 26 Ogos, Jerman mengadakan barisan baru di sepanjang Somme selatan dari Péronne, kemudian melintasi negara terbuka menuju Noyon di Oise. Pada 29 Ogos orang New Zealand menangkap Bapaume, di tengah-tengah garis ini. Orang Australia membuat kejayaan seterusnya, bertempur di Somme pada malam 30-31 Ogos dan menangkap Péronne. Akhirnya, pada 2 September Korps Kanada, bertempur dengan Tentera Pertama, menerobos suis Drocourt-Quéant, di tenggara Arras. Penembusan ini memaksa Jerman untuk meninggalkan garis Somme dan mundur hingga ke Hindenburg Line.

Tahap kejayaan tentera dan Komanwel yang tidak dijangka di Amiens dan Bapaume mendorong Foch untuk merancang serangan tiga kali ganda secara besar-besaran untuk akhir bulan September, dengan tujuan untuk memecahkan Garis Hindenburg dan memaksa Jerman keluar dari Perancis (Meuse-Argonne menyerang, pertempuran Flanders dan pertempuran Cambrai-St. Quentin).

Jerman mengalami kerugian yang sangat besar semasa pertempuran Amiens. British dan Perancis menangkap 33,000 tahanan dan menyebabkan antara 50,000 hingga 70,000 korban di Jerman. British kehilangan 22,000 lelaki, Perancis 20,000. Serangan tiga kali ganda yang hebat akan mencapai tujuan utamanya, dan mencetuskan kejatuhan Jerman akhirnya, tetapi dengan kos yang jauh lebih tinggi.

Buku mengenai Perang Dunia Pertama | Indeks Subjek: Perang Dunia Pertama


Pertempuran Somme 1918: Serangan Musim Panas Bersekutu

Pertempuran Kedua Somme 1918 diperjuangkan pada musim panas tahun itu, berikutan serangan Operasi Michael musim bunga Jerman. Serangan Sekutu musim panas dibuka dengan Pertempuran Amiens pada 8 Ogos. Tentera Perancis menyerang pada masa yang sama di selatan sungai Somme dalam Pertempuran Montdidier. Sepuluh bahagian Sekutu terlibat termasuk pasukan Australia dan Kanada yang berkhidmat dengan Tentera Keempat Britain. Pasukan Sekutu mengejutkan Jerman pada hari pertama 8 Ogos dan membuat kemajuan pesat ke arah timur sejauh beberapa batu, membawa ratusan tahanan Jerman dalam perjalanan. Kemajuan yang signifikan merebut kembali banyak tanah yang hilang oleh Sekutu pada bulan Mac, awal tahun ini. Pertempuran ini menandakan berakhirnya kebuntuan perang parit di Front Barat, gabungan berkesan infanteri, sokongan udara dan kereta kebal. Itu adalah permulaan beberapa pertempuran dari bulan Ogos hingga November 1918, yang dikenali sebagai Seratus Hari Serangan. Kejayaan Bersekutu pada 8 Ogos adalah hari hitam bagi Tentera Jerman.

Tentera Ketiga Britain dan Kor II Amerika Syarikat melancarkan serangan itu untuk merebut kembali Albert pada 21 Ogos. Bandar Albert ditawan semula pada 22 dan bandar Bapaume ditawan pada 29 Ogos.

Kejayaan Pertempuran Amiens diteruskan dengan Pertempuran Bapaume Kedua dari 21 Ogos. Tentera Ketiga Britain dan Kor II Amerika Syarikat melancarkan serangan itu. Bandar Albert ditawan semula pada 22 dan bandar Bapaume ditawan pada 29 Ogos.

Pada malam 30/31 Ogos pasukan Divisi 2 Australia melintasi tanah rawa dan sungai Somme untuk menuju ke lereng ke tanah tinggi Mont St. Quentin. Kedudukan yang dipegang oleh Jerman di atas bukit ini menghadap ke kota P & eacuteronne dan memberikan peluang yang baik kepada Jerman terhadap sebarang serangan Sekutu pada waktu siang. Berjaya mengambil puncak bukit, orang Australia ditolak lagi ketika cadangan Jerman tiba untuk merebut kembali kedudukan. Keesokan harinya, bagaimanapun, orang Australia berjaya mendorong orang Jerman dari bukit sepenuhnya dan akhirnya di bawah kawalan Sekutu. Bandar P & eacuteronne ditawan pada 1 September. Unit Australia yang terlibat mengalami korban yang tinggi tetapi telah mencapai kejayaan besar dalam merebut kedudukan tersebut, yang mengakibatkan permulaan penarikan Jerman ke timur.


Dari Amiens hingga Gencatan Senjata: Seratus Hari Menyinggung

Seratus Hari Serangan, juga dikenal sebagai Kemajuan ke Kemenangan, adalah satu siri kejayaan Bersekutu yang mendorong Tentera Darat Jerman kembali ke medan perang pada tahun 1914.

Serangan Musim Semi Jerman hampir melanggar garis depan Sekutu tetapi mereka berjaya bertahan. Dalam Pertempuran Kedua Marne (15 Julai-6 Ogos), Jerman sekali lagi gagal memberikan pukulan yang menentukan dan pada 18 Julai serangan balas Sekutu, yang dipimpin oleh Perancis, mendorong mereka kembali. Marne menjadi serangan terakhir Jerman. Sekutu kini mengambil inisiatif.

Kerjasama merupakan faktor penting dalam kejayaan serangan. Jeneral Ferdinand Foch dilantik sebagai Panglima Panglima Angkatan Bersekutu di Front Barat pada bulan Mac 1918. Dia mengarahkan strategi keseluruhan yang memastikan pendekatan terkoordinasi oleh tentera Perancis, Britain dan Amerika.

Sekutu Kawal Langit

Sekutu Kawal Langit

Serangan Seratus Hari sebenarnya merangkumi 95 hari bermula dengan Pertempuran Amiens pada 8 Ogos 1918 dan berakhir dengan Gencatan Senjata pada 11 November 1918.

Menjelang musim panas tahun 1918, Sekutu telah menguasai langit. Pesawat Inggeris, Perancis dan Amerika kadang kala melebihi rakan sepasukan Jerman mereka lima hingga satu. Penguasaan mereka di udara memungkinkan Sekutu memotret kedudukan Jerman dan mengarahkan tembakan artileri mereka dari pesawat serta mencegah Jerman melakukan perkara yang sama. Ini membolehkan Sekutu menyembunyikan persiapan mereka dan membuat Tentera Jerman meneka dari mana datangnya serangan seterusnya.

The Pertempuran Amiens Bermula

The Pertempuran Amiens Bermula

Pada pukul 4.20 pagi 8 Ogos 1918, Pertempuran Amiens bermula. Pagi itu kelam kabut dan orang Jerman terkejut. Beberapa pegawai Jerman dilaporkan ditangkap ketika masih makan sarapan mereka! Korps Australia dan Kor Kanada menerajui serangan itu dan maju dengan cepat di belakang 534 kereta kebal, mencapai objektif mereka dalam beberapa jam.

Ketika kemajuan dihentikan pada 11 Ogos, Sekutu mengalihkan serangan mereka ke bahagian lain dari garis. Strategi baru ini menyumbang kepada kejayaan serangan dengan terus meregangkan sumber daya dan tenaga kerja Tentera Darat Jerman. Sekutu terus menyerang dengan cara ini sepanjang musim panas dan musim luruh tahun 1918, memberi sedikit masa untuk tentera Jerman yang semakin letih dan habis.

Menjelang akhir bulan Ogos, sekutu telah menangkap Albert, Bapaume, Noyon dan Peronne semasa Pertempuran Kedua Somme.

Orang Amerika

Orang Amerika

Pada akhir bulan Ogos, terdapat lebih daripada 1.4 juta tentera Amerika di Perancis. Ketibaan pasukan baru inilah yang memungkinkan Sekutu untuk terus berperang setelah mengalami kerugian besar semasa Serangan Musim Semi Jerman.

Serangan ke atas St Mihiel (12-15 September) adalah serangan pertama dan satu-satunya yang dipimpin Amerika semasa Perang Dunia Pertama. Itu adalah kemenangan yang agak mudah kerana berjaya mengalahkan Tentera Darat Jerman tetapi mereka menjadikan Tentera Amerika sebagai pasukan pertempuran yang hebat.

Dengan kejayaan di St Mihiel, orang Amerika tergerak untuk menyokong serangan ambisius yang dirancang oleh Marshal Foch di Battles of Meuse-Argonne. Ini adalah sumbangan utama Tentera Amerika dalam Perang Dunia Pertama dan kerugiannya tinggi di antara pasukan mereka yang tidak berpengalaman.

Ke dalam Buka

Ke dalam Buka

Tentera Sekutu menggunakan taktik baru untuk mengatasi kebuntuan perang parit. Artileri, kereta kebal dan kekuatan udara berjaya digunakan dalam pendekatan semua lengan terkoordinasi yang baru. Kejayaan sekutu menyaksikan pertempuran bergerak dari parit keluar ke tempat terbuka.

Artileri sekutu mendominasi medan perang membuka jalan untuk kejayaan. Namun, senapang mesin Jerman menghalang kemajuan mereka sehingga kebanyakan serangan dilakukan di bawah kegelapan.

Kereta kebal masih merupakan senjata yang relatif baru dan paling berguna untuk menghancurkan rintangan kawat berduri, memusnahkan tiang senapang mesin dan pertempuran desa. Mereka akan diikuti oleh kumpulan kecil infanteri. Mereka membawa buaian, bingkai yang terbuat dari kayu dan besi, yang dapat dijatuhkan untuk memungkinkan mereka menyeberangi parit lebar.

Pergerakan yang cepat menyebabkan kesukaran untuk mendapatkan bekalan ke depan, dan beberapa tentera yang berada di lapangan pada tahun 1918 telah mendapat latihan dalam perang terbuka.

The Talian Hindenburg

The Talian Hindenburg

Pada akhir bulan September, pasukan Sekutu telah menghadapi garis Hindenburg, satu siri kedudukan yang sangat kuat yang membentuk pertahanan utama Jerman.

Pertempuran Terusan St Quentin (29 September 1918) adalah kemenangan penting yang menembusi salah satu bahagian terkuat di Hindenburg Line. Setelah terobosan sepenuhnya pada awal Oktober, Jenderal Ludendorff dilaporkan mengatakan bahawa "situasi Tentera [Jerman] menuntut gencatan senjata segera untuk menyelamatkan bencana".

Walaupun masih beberapa minggu sebelum Gencatan Senjata, jelas bahawa Jerman sekarang tidak dapat memenangi perang.

The 'Hari Hitam Tentera Jerman'

The 'Hari Hitam Tentera Jerman'

Sepanjang Seratus Hari Serangan, moral yang lemah dalam Tentera Darat Jerman memberi sumbangan besar kepada kemenangan Sekutu. Kegagalan Serangan Musim Semi dan serangan balas yang mengejutkan di Amiens merosakkan pasukan Jerman. Kira-kira 30,000 tentera Jerman menyerah semasa Pertempuran Amiens. Ludendorff menggambarkan hari pertama pertempuran ini sebagai "hari hitam Tentera Jerman". Sebilangan besar tahanan Jerman juga ditangkap di Pertempuran Terusan St. Quentin. Bahagian ke-46 sahaja menangkap lebih daripada 4,000 lelaki. Jeneral Sir Henry Rawlinson menyatakan bahawa garis Hindenburg akan tidak dapat ditembus jika dibela oleh Tentera Jerman dua tahun sebelumnya.

Kor Kanada Mencapai Mons

Kor Kanada Mencapai Mons

Korps Kanada sampai ke Mons pada jam 4 pagi 11 November 1918. Mereka dikelilingi oleh orang awam yang gembira semasa mereka berjalan di jalanan. Mons telah menjadi lokasi pertempuran pertama yang dilakukan oleh Tentera Inggeris pada bulan Ogos 1914 dan telah dijajah oleh Jerman selama perang.

Pertempuran di Front Barat berlanjutan hingga saat-saat terakhir hingga akhirnya, pada pukul 11 ​​pagi 11 November 1918, Gencatan Senjata mula berlaku dan permusuhan berhenti.

The Kos kemenangan

The Kos kemenangan

Seratus Hari Serangan membawa kemenangan, tetapi dengan kos yang besar. Korban sekutu antara Ogos dan November 1918 adalah sekitar 700,000. Korban Jerman sedikit lebih tinggi sekitar 760,000.

Pada mulanya Sekutu tidak menyangka serangan akan mengakhiri perang tetapi merancang serangan terakhir mereka untuk Musim Bunga tahun 1919. Namun, prestasi senjata mereka yang mengagumkan selama Seratus Hari mematahkan semangat Tentera Jerman dan menimbulkan kerugian yang tidak dapat mereka lakukan pulih.


Konflik ketenteraan serupa dengan atau seperti Battle of Amiens (1918)

Siri serangan besar-besaran Sekutu yang mengakhiri Perang Dunia Pertama. Bermula dengan Pertempuran Amiens (8-12 Ogos) di Front Barat, Sekutu mendorong Kuasa Tengah kembali, membatalkan keuntungan mereka dari Spring Offensive. Wikipedia

Serangan ketenteraan Jerman yang besar semasa Perang Dunia Pertama yang memulakan serangan Musim Semi pada 21 Mac 1918. Dilancarkan dari Hindenburg Line, di sekitar Saint-Quentin, Perancis. Wikipedia

Berjuang semasa Perang Dunia Pertama di Front Barat dari akhir Ogos hingga awal September, di lembah Sungai Somme. Sebahagian daripada rangkaian serangan balas yang berjaya sebagai tindak balas terhadap serangan musim bunga Jerman, setelah jeda untuk penempatan semula dan bekalan. Wikipedia

Siri serangan Jerman di sepanjang Front Barat semasa Perang Dunia Pertama, bermula pada 21 Mac 1918. Untuk mengalahkan Sekutu sebelum Amerika Syarikat dapat menggunakan sumbernya sepenuhnya. Wikipedia

Sebahagian daripada Seratus Hari Serangan Perang Dunia Pertama oleh Sekutu terhadap kedudukan Jerman di Front Barat. Bahagian Canal du Nord yang tidak lengkap dan di pinggir Cambrai antara 27 September dan 1 Oktober 1918. Wikipedia

Senarai kekuatan yang terlibat dalam Pertempuran Amiens dari Perang Dunia I yang dilancarkan dari 8 Ogos hingga 11 Ogos 1918. Pasukan sekutu di Amiens berada di bawah komando tertinggi Jeneral Ferdinand Foch. Wikipedia

Perintah pertempuran untuk Operasi Michael, sebahagian dari serangan musim semi Jerman yang diperjuangkan dari 21 Mac hingga 5 April 1918 sebagai salah satu pertunangan utama Perang Dunia Pertama. Pergaduhan antara pasukan gabungan Perancis, Inggeris dan Dominion dan Wikipedia

Serangan Inggeris di Front Barat semasa Perang Dunia I. Dari 9 April hingga 16 Mei 1917, tentera Inggeris menyerang pertahanan Jerman berhampiran bandar Arras di Perancis di Front Barat. Wikipedia

Pertempuran penting Perang Dunia I yang bermula pada 29 September 1918 dan melibatkan pasukan Inggeris, Australia dan Amerika yang beroperasi sebagai sebahagian daripada Tentera Darat Keempat British di bawah komando Jeneral Sir Henry Rawlinson secara keseluruhan. Lebih jauh ke utara, sebahagian Tentera Ketiga Britain juga menyokong serangan itu. Wikipedia

Pertempuran antara tentera Sekutu dan Tentera Jerman, bertempur semasa Serangan Hari Serangan Perang Dunia I. Selepas Pertempuran Kedua di Cambrai, Sekutu maju hampir 2 batu dan membebaskan bandar-bandar Perancis Naves dan Thun-Saint-Martin. Wikipedia

Pertempuran antara tentera Angkatan Pertama, Ketiga dan Keempat British dan tentera Empayar Jerman semasa Serangan Seratus Hari Perang Dunia Pertama. Pertempuran itu berlaku di dan sekitar bandar Cambrai di Perancis, antara 8 dan 10 Oktober 1918. Wikipedia

Pertempuran Perang Dunia Pertama yang berlaku di Bapaume di Perancis, dari 21 Ogos 1918 hingga 3 September 1918. Kesinambungan Pertempuran Albert dan juga disebut sebagai fasa kedua pertempuran itu. Wikipedia

Pertempuran Kedua Villers-Bretonneux (juga Tindakan Villers-Bretonneux, setelah Pertempuran Pertama Somme, 1918) berlangsung dari 24 hingga 27 April 1918, semasa Serangan Musim Semi Jerman di sebelah timur Amiens. Terkenal sebagai peristiwa pertama di mana kereta kebal bertempur antara satu sama lain, ini adalah aksi tangki terbesar dan paling berjaya tentera Jerman dalam Perang Dunia Pertama. Wikipedia

Pertempuran Perang Dunia Pertama yang diperjuangkan oleh tentera Empayar Inggeris dan Republik Ketiga Perancis menentang Empayar Jerman. Ia berlaku antara 1 Julai dan 18 November 1916 di kedua-dua belah hulu Sungai Somme di Perancis. Wikipedia

Pertempuran antara tentera Angkatan Pertama dan Ketiga British dan pasukan Empayar Jerman semasa Serangan Hari Serangan Perang Dunia Pertama. Tindakan itu berlaku di dan sekitar perbandaran Honnelles di Belgia, antara 5 dan 7 November 1918. Wikipedia

Tentera Inggeris semasa Perang Dunia I berperang terbesar dan paling mahal dalam sejarahnya yang panjang. Dibentuk secara eksklusif dari sukarelawan - sebagai lawan dari wajib militer - pada awal konflik. Wikipedia

Serangan berjaya oleh tentera darat Australia dan tentera AS, yang disokong oleh kereta kebal Britain, terhadap kedudukan Jerman di dalam dan sekitar bandar Le Hamel, di utara Perancis, semasa Perang Dunia I. Dirancang dan diperintah oleh Leftenan Jeneral John Monash, komandan Kor Australia . Wikipedia

Kempen Perang Dunia Pertama, yang diperjuangkan oleh Sekutu menentang Empayar Jerman. Pertempuran itu berlaku di Front Barat, dari bulan Julai hingga November 1917, untuk mengawal rabung di selatan dan timur kota Ypres di Belgia di Flanders Barat, sebagai sebahagian daripada strategi yang diputuskan oleh Sekutu pada persidangan pada bulan November 1916 dan Mei 1917 Wikipedia

Pemimpin Sekutu Perang Dunia I adalah tokoh politik dan ketenteraan yang memperjuangkan atau menyokong Sekutu semasa Perang Dunia I. Nicholas II - Czar Terakhir Rusia, Raja Poland yang berkuasa, dan Grand Duke of Finland. Wikipedia

Pertempuran Perang Dunia Pertama dilancarkan pada 18 September 1918, yang melibatkan Tentera Darat Keempat British di bawah komando Jeneral Henry Rawlinson menentang kedudukan pos Jerman di hadapan Garis Hindenburg. Ditangkap pada 18 September oleh Bahagian ke-12. Wikipedia

Mengenai peranan Douglas Haig pada tahun 1918. Panglima Angkatan Ekspedisi Inggeris (BEF) di Front Barat. Wikipedia


Selepas

Pertempuran Amiens adalah titik tolak utama dalam tempo perang. Jerman telah memulakan perang dengan Rancangan Schlieffen sebelum Perlumbaan ke Laut melambatkan pergerakan di Front Barat dan perang berubah menjadi perang parit. Serangan Musim Semi Jerman pada awal tahun itu sekali lagi memberi Jerman kelebihan serangan di Front Barat. Sokongan berperisai membantu Sekutu merobek lubang melalui parit, melemahkan kedudukan parit yang tidak dapat ditembusi. Tentera Ketiga British tanpa sokongan perisai hampir tidak berpengaruh di garis sementara Keempat, dengan kurang dari seribu kereta kebal, menerobos masuk ke wilayah Jerman. Panglima Australia John Monash diketuai oleh Raja George V pada hari-hari selepas pertempuran.

Wartawan perang Britain, Philip Gibbs mencatat kesan Amiens terhadap tempo perang, dengan mengatakan pada 27 Ogos bahawa, "musuh. Sedang bertahan" dan, "inisiatif serangan berada di tangan kita sehingga kita dapat menyerang dia di banyak tempat yang berbeza. " Gibbs juga memberi penghargaan kepada Amiens dengan perubahan semangat pasukan, dengan mengatakan, "perubahan itu lebih besar dalam pemikiran orang daripada mengambil alih wilayah. Di pihak kita, tentera sepertinya didukung dengan harapan besar untuk meneruskan ini perniagaan dengan cepat "dan itu," ada perubahan juga dalam fikiran musuh. Mereka tidak lagi mempunyai harapan yang redup untuk menang di bahagian barat ini. Yang mereka harapkan sekarang adalah untuk mempertahankan diri mereka cukup lama untuk mendapatkan kedamaian melalui perundingan. "

KONGSI HALAMAN!


Perang dunia adalah perang yang melibatkan banyak atau sebahagian besar negara paling berkuasa dan berpenduduk di dunia. Perang dunia merangkumi beberapa negara di beberapa benua, dengan pertempuran yang diadakan di beberapa teater. Istilah ini digunakan untuk dua konflik antarabangsa utama yang berlaku pada abad kedua puluh: Perang Dunia Pertama dan Kedua.


Ribut Baja

Bagi peminat podcast, Sir Hew Strachan melihat Pertempuran Amiens secara mendalam di SINI.

Rob Thompson juga telah menulis makalah untuk Persatuan Front Barat mengenai perancangan pertempuran dan cabaran logistik, klik DI SINI untuk PDF kertas kerja.

Terdapat banyak perkara untuk memasukkan gigi anda!

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Komen

Benar-benar baik, adakah grid n 8 x 6 Jika demikian adalah standard untuk bashing persegi dan siapa yang membuat angka tersebut. Menyalin ini ke Laman Wargames juga. Terima kasih kerana menghantarnya, saya suka grid dan ini sangat berbeza.

Terima kasih Norm, saya menjawab di TWW, tetapi sekiranya ada orang lain yang membaca ini: grid adalah kotak 6 & quot di papan 4 x3 kaki, yang merupakan ukuran Square Bashing standard. Semua tokoh berasal dari Peter Pig, kecuali dua kereta kebal dari pengembangan Perang Besar PSC!


Penggunaan wayarles pada Pertempuran Amiens 8 - 11 Ogos 1918

Disertasi yang diserahkan sebagai sebahagian daripada syarat untuk memperoleh gelar MA dalam Pengajian Perang Dunia Pertama Inggeris di University of Birmingham. Karya ini memenangi hadiah WFA untuk disertasi terbaik tahun 2013 yang dianugerahkan pada Persidangan Presiden WFA tahun 2014.

Pengenalan

  • Bab 1 Isyarat Kecerdasan: Rancangan untuk kerahsiaan dan penipuan
  • Bab 2 Penggunaan wayarles dengan daya darat
  • Bab 3 Penggunaan tanpa wayar dengan Tentera Udara Diraja
  • Kesimpulannya
  • Bibliografi

Singkatan

  • Laksamana ADM.
  • Artileri Lapangan Australia AFA.
  • Kementerian Udara Udara.
  • Memorial Perang Australia AWM, Canberra.
  • Pasukan Ekspedisi Inggeris BEF.
  • Pegawai Kakitangan Bateri Kaunter CBSO.
  • Artileri Berat CCHA Canadian Corps.
  • Gelombang Berterusan CW.
  • Markas Besar GHQ (BEF).
  • Ketua Pegawai Pemerintah GOC.
  • Ibu Pejabat HQ.
  • Muzium Perang Imperial IWM, London.
  • Pusat Arkib Tentera LHCMA Liddle Hart, London.
  • Arkib Negara NAC Kanada, Ottawa.
  • Penghantaran Tentera Rasmi O.A.D
  • ATAU Peringkat Lain.
  • Artileri Diraja RA.
  • Institut Artileri Diraja RAI, London.
  • R.A.F. Tentera Udara Diraja
  • Artileri Medan Diraja RFA.
  • RFC Royal Flying Corps.
  • Arkib Negara TNA, London.
  • Telegrafi WT Tanpa Wayar.
  • Pejabat Perang WO.

Pengenalan

Terdapat konsensus umum di kalangan sejarawan bahawa Pertempuran Amiens menandakan permulaan akhir di Front Barat semasa Perang Dunia Pertama. [1] Objektif disertasi ini adalah untuk mengkaji peranan dan sumbangan komunikasi tanpa wayar terhadap kejayaan Pasukan Ekspedisi Inggeris (selepas ini BEF) dalam empat hari dari 8 hingga 11 Ogos 1918.

Kepentingan Amiens dan komunikasi tanpa wayar

Walaupun terdapat konsensus yang disebutkan di atas, Sejarawan rasmi Britain, Brigadier-Jeneral Sir James Edmonds, berpendapat bahawa kejayaan yang diperoleh di Amiens hanyalah 'apa yang akan disebut oleh Jerman sebagai kemenangan biasa'. [2] Edmonds terus menjelaskan pernyataan ini dengan menjelaskan bahawa, walaupun Amiens bukanlah kemenangan yang strategik, namun Tentara Jerman tetap memberi tamparan kuat kepada semangat mereka, yang mengakibatkan hilangnya kepercayaan pada kemenangan akhir. [3] Namun, mungkin lebih tepat untuk menyatakan bahawa Amiens memperburuk penurunan semangat dalam Tentera Darat Jerman, penurunan yang telah dimulai dalam tempoh setelah serangan Mac yang gagal. [4] Ini disahkan oleh Jeneral Erich Ludendorff yang walaupun menyebut 8 Ogos sebagai 'Hari Hitam Tentara Jerman', percaya bahawa itu adalah kehilangan disiplin dan kemampuan pertempuran sebelumnya yang menjadi punca kejatuhan. [5] Kehilangan disiplin ini jelas dapat dilihat di Amiens, ukuran yang dapat diperoleh dari jumlah tahanan yang diambil oleh BEF lebih banyak tentera musuh ditangkap dalam enam hari dari 6 Ogos hingga 12 Ogos daripada gabungan sembilan bulan sebelumnya. [ 6] Oleh itu, Amiens memberikan tentara Jerman yang hebat dan akibatnya 8 Ogos layak mendapat gelaran yang diciptakan oleh Charles Messenger: 'Hari Kami Menang Perang'. [7]

Paddy Griffith berpendapat bahawa kegagalan komunikasi di Front Barat adalah faktor pembatas dalam mencapai penembusan yang menentukan. [8] Walaupun Amiens bukan pertempuran 'break-out', namun ia adalah 'break-in' yang berjaya di mana komunikasi memainkan peranan penting. Ukuran kepentingan ini dapat diperoleh dari statistik yang berkaitan dengan lalu lintas telegraf Tentera Darat Keempat, yang menunjukkan bahawa dari 8 - 11 Ogos terdapat rata-rata 6.100 telegraf yang dikendalikan setiap hari. [9] Tidak ada perincian angka-angka ini yang tersedia tetapi kemungkinan besar kebanyakannya dikendalikan oleh jaringan kabel tanah dan kutub daripada tanpa wayar. [10] Namun, sejak berundur pada bulan Mac, telah diakui bahawa wayarles adalah alat komunikasi penting dalam peperangan bergerak. [11] Akibatnya sejumlah langkah diambil pada awal musim panas 1918 untuk memaksa penyatuan teknologi ini ke dalam kebijakan isyarat standard. Ini termasuk peruntukan hari-hari tertentu untuk digunakan semata-mata untuk komunikasi tanpa wayar dan hari latihan untuk mensimulasikan penggunaan wayarles dalam peperangan mudah alih. [12] Amiens adalah peluang pertama yang tepat untuk menentukan sama ada keyakinan baru ini yang diletakkan dalam wayarles dibenarkan.

Pensejarahan

Walaupun kejayaan di Amiens akhirnya membawa kemenangan di barat pada periode Perang Dunia Pertama ini diabaikan, orang Britain lebih suka mengingati 'lumpur dan darah' pertempuran pada tahun 1916 dan 1917. [13] Jonathan Boff telah menunjukkan bahawa budaya ini meluas kepada sejarawan kerana 24 karya sejarah ketenteraan diterbitkan pada ulang tahun ke-90 Pertempuran Somme berbanding dengan hanya empat pada ulang tahun ke-90 'Hundred Days'. [14] Salah satu penjelasan yang lebih jelas untuk kekurangan karya sejarah ini adalah daya tarik yang hampir tidak menentu dengan tragedi perang tetapi Sydney Wise menunjukkan bahawa sejarawan Inggeris telah menghindari tempoh ini kerana penguasaannya oleh kejayaan Dominion. [15] Yang pertama lebih masuk akal daripada yang terakhir. Sejumlah karya berwibawa memang ada, terutama berkaitan dengan masa Seratus Hari, mungkin yang paling pasti adalah Kisah Tentera Keempat oleh Mejar Jeneral Sir Archibald Montgomery. [16] Karya ini ditulis dari perspektif peribadi yang unik dengan pengarang mempunyai akses istimewa ke banyak dokumen asli dan karenanya kaya dengan perincian operasi. Walau bagaimanapun, ini jelas kurang terperinci mengenai komunikasi dan isyarat. Karya sekunder yang lebih baru tidak lebih baik dalam hal ini, contohnya adalah Amiens to the Armistice dan The Day We Won the War. [17] Sebagai contoh, yang terakhir ini tidak menyebut karya balon layang-layang atau pesawat artileri, yang keduanya menggunakan wayarles secara meluas dalam pertempuran, ini walaupun terdapat bab yang dikhaskan untuk operasi udara. [18] Anehnya, kritikan serupa dapat dilontarkan pada Sejarah Rasmi R.A.F. semasa Perang Dunia Pertama. [19] Tiga Sejarah Rasmi kebangsaan juga mengandungi kekurangan rujukan berkenaan dengan tanpa wayar, hanya ada 10 keseluruhan tiga orang Britain, tiga Australia dan empat Kanada. [20] Yang terakhir ini memperincikan banyak perincian mengenai rancangan penipuan di Amiens, yang merupakan subjek Bab 1, tetapi memberikan sedikit maklumat mengenai aspek rancangan tanpa wayar. [21] Sejarah komprehensif karya Perkhidmatan Isyarat ditulis pada tahun 1921 dan sehingga baru-baru ini karya ini tetap menjadi teks yang berwibawa. Walau bagaimanapun, narasi staccatonya sukar dibaca dan digambarkan oleh Paddy Griffith sebagai 'buku positif yang paling tidak dapat ditembusi yang pernah ditulis mengenai perang'. [22] Kajian yang jelas lebih moden dan boleh dibaca adalah Ph.D Brian Hall. tesis komunikasi, yang dicadangkan oleh Jonathan Boff akan menggantikan Priestley dan menjadi 'karya standard'. [23] Walaupun karya ini mengandungi bab 20 halaman mengenai komunikasi di Battle of Amiens, di mana wayarles dibincangkan secara terperinci, tidak ada ukuran kepentingannya semasa pertempuran. [24] Karya Hall yang kemudian, yang dikhaskan untuk komunikasi tanpa wayar, menerangkan 'kurva pembelajaran' berkaitan dengan kepentingan wayarles dalam pertempuran mudah alih dan daya maju sebagai alternatif untuk kabel. [25] Batasan karya ini adalah skopnya luas dan oleh itu tidak dapat memikirkan tindakan atau pertunangan tertentu Amiens hanya disebut secara ringkas dalam konteks yang lebih luas dari Seratus Hari.

Sumber Utama

Sebilangan besar bahan yang digunakan dalam disertasi ini terkandung di dalam pelbagai War Diaries di National Archives, London. Walau bagaimanapun, terdapat beberapa jurang dalam catatan ini, yang terbesar berkaitan dengan kumpulan pemerhatian tanpa wayar, sekolah isyarat dan pemecahan kod yang terakhir, hanya 25 dari 3,330 fail yang terselamat. [26] Selain itu, hanya ada satu buku harian yang tersisa dari sekolah isyarat tentera dan hanya satu buku harian dari kumpulan pemerhatian tanpa wayar yang berkaitan dengan teater Timur Tengah dan tidak mengandungi maklumat berguna. [27] Kertas dan memoar peribadi didapati berguna walaupun terdapat kekurangan memoar yang berkaitan dengan kakitangan tanpa wayar. [28]

Disertasi ini akan cuba mengukur keberkesanan tanpa wayar semasa pertempuran dengan menganalisis tiga subjek utama masing-masing dengan babnya sendiri. Chapter 1 will examine the importance of signals intelligence to the secrecy plan and what contribution it made to the fundamental objective of maintaining the element of surprise. The British Official History refers to this element of surprise as 'the essence of the Allied success'.[29] The key questions to be addressed in this chapter therefore are first, how important was the element of surprise to the overall success of the battle and second, what part did wireless play in maintaining the element of surprise? In order to answer these questions the secrecy plan will be broken down into three component parts namely the feint at Kemmel in Flanders, the feint at Arras, and the measures taken on the Fourth Army front at Amiens.

Chapter 2 will focus on a the use of wireless by the ground forces, including infantry, artillery, tanks, as well as ancillary formations such as the field survey companies. One of the key objectives of this chapter is to provide information that can assist in determining whether there is a relationship between combat effectiveness and the use of wireless. The initial problem is to determine which troops were the most combat effective. The Dominion troops gained a reputation as elite troops on the Western Front and this reputation was reinforced by Sir James Edmonds who believed that the Australian and Canadian officers and n.c.o's demonstrated superior leadership qualities in relation to their British counterparts.[30]Peter Simkins suggests that Edmonds criticism of British junior leadership is unjustified and has launched a convincing defence of British divisions.[31] Simkins cites the average success rate in opposed attacks for the nine British divisions who served in Fourth Army during the Hundred Days as 70.7 per cent.[32] This is identical to the figure for the five Australian divisions and similar to that of the four Canadian divisions, the latter achieving 72.5 per cent.[33] This comparative study of the combat performance of the British and Dominion divisions in Fourth Army will be mirrored with respect to the use of wireless in this dissertation. One of the problems faced in compiling this chapter was the paucity of primary sources in relation to the British divisions that took part at Amiens. This is in complete contrast to the Canadian and Australian records that contain a wealth of detailed information, which makes a comparison difficult. The key questions to be addressed in this chapter are first, to what extent was wireless used with the ground forces at Amiens, second, how does the use of wireless compare between the Dominion and British divisions and third, how important was wireless in the overall communications scheme.

Chapter 3 will examine the use wireless by the R.A.F., specifically aircraft and kite balloons. These balloons have received little attention from historians despite being a key component of the artillery counter battery function as well important gatherers of intelligence both at a tactical and operation level. This chapter will show that balloons were actually responsible for the neutralisation of more hostile batteries by wireless than dedicated artillery aircraft during the battle. This is despite the fact that artillery aircraft had been using wireless extensively since 1917 as Bidwell and Graham have observed:

By 1917, as 90 per cent of counter battery observation was done by airmen using wireless, the success of the artillery battle had come to depend on the weather being suitable for flying, on wireless reception and on a network of telephone lines from the receivers to the users of the airmen's information.[34]

The key questions that will be examined in this chapter are first, to what extent was wireless used with the air forces and second how important were these wireless equipped craft to the overall effectiveness of the artillery function.

In summary this dissertation will add to the historiography of both the Battle of Amiens and communications by examining the use of wireless in the most decisive battle of the First World War. Tim Travers has argued that technology was more important than tactics when it came to the combination of arms in 1918 this is perhaps going too far but there is little doubt that technology when used correctly is important in warfare.[35] This dissertation will show that the BEF was using new technology such as wireless to good effect and attempting to integrate it into an evolving weapons system. It will also show that wireless was a useful but not essential component of that system.

Chapter 1

Signals Intelligence: The plans for secrecy and deception

On 17 July 1918 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, GOC Fourth Army, wrote to GHQ outlining his proposals for the offensive and emphasizing the importance of secrecy:

The success of the operation will depend to a very great extent, as was the case on the 4th July, on effecting a complete surprise. Secrecy, in my opinion, is therefore, of vital importance and must be the basis on which the whole scheme is built up.[36]

The measures used to bring about surprise form the basis of the discussion in this chapter, particularly with respect to wireless. In addition, an attempt will be made to determine how effective these measures were and what contribution they made to the overall success of the operation.

The plan to bring about surprise at Amiens was highly complex but the majority of its components were encapsulated in three operational documents, two of which were issued by GHQ and one by Fourth Army.[37] At this stage of the war GHQ was exercising much more control over matters of operational security and pursuing a 'definite policy' of misleading the enemy.[38] The plan was essentially in three parts, namely preparations for a feint attack at Kemmel, preparations for a feint attack at Arras and finally, matters pertaining to general operational security. An overview of these plans can be seen in the charts below.

The Kemmel feint was not only aimed at deliberately misleading the enemy as to the location of a potential offensive but more importantly, it was designed to camouflage the movement of Canadian Corps from Arras to Amiens. With a fighting strength of 118,000 men the Canadian Corps was the largest Corps in the BEF and they were well known to the Germans as attacking troops.[39] As Rawlinson noted shortly after the battle: 'wherever the Canadian Corps was identified by the enemy, he would certainly expect an early offensive'.[40]

Diagram 1.1: The Kemmel Plan

This plan, issued on 27 July, involved the Canadian and Tank wireless sets along with their respective operators, two Canadian infantry battalions, and two Canadian casualty clearing stations, all being relocated from First Army to Second Army.[41] In addition the R.A.F. was ordered to make arrangements with Second Army for occupation of additional aerodromes and to steadily increase aerial activity on this front up to two days before the battle.[42] The object of these arrangements was:

. to give colour to a plan for the interpolation of the Canadian Corps into the line with a view to delivering an attack. The wireless stations will operate and the Battalions be put into the line.[43]

It was hoped that this would give the impression of an advanced party paving the way for the imminent arrival of the whole Canadian Corps and to make this seem more convincing false movement orders were issued on 28 July.[44] The historian S.F. Wise has commented that the measures of deception used to hide the movement of the Canadian Corps are well known.[45] This is not strictly correct as although many abridged accounts have appeared in historical works they tend to be based almost entirely on information contained within the Official Histories, are lacking in detail and contain a number of inaccuracies. For example, Tim Travers incorrectly states that when the Canadian Corps moved to Fourth Army they disguised their move by 'leaving their radio units behind'.[46] The source of this inaccuracy is probably Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson who, in an uncharacteristic misquote of the Canadian Official History, state that 'dummy wireless stations were set up at Arras'.[47] The Canadian Official History correctly places these dummy wireless stations in Flanders.[48] However, it is not only the location of the wireless stations that is incorrectly cited but also details of the actual units that took part. For instance, Shane Schreiber states that these units were the Canadian Corps wireless section they were however divisional units as instructed in the operational orders.[49] Some confusion on this point is justified though as it is difficult to extract a definitive answer from the war diaries regarding exactly which units were involved. The diary of the 1 Canadian Divisional Signal Company states that orders were received from First Army on 30 July to send the headquarters wireless set, along with wireless operators, to Flanders and that X Corps took receipt later that day.[50] The 1 Canadian Division's after action report confirms this but adds that it was the wireless sets of all four Canadian divisions that were sent north to Second Army.[51] However, there is no mention of this in the respective war diaries of those other divisions. Further confusion arises as a result of an entry in the GHQ war diary, which contains an instruction to Second Army, dated 2 August to immediately return the 2 Canadian Divisional wireless sets to Fourth Army.[52] This diary though makes no mention of any other Canadian divisional sets, including those of 1 Canadian Division.[53] This leaves two possible explanations, either one of the GHQ or 1 Canadian Division war diaries could be in error, or both the 1 Canadian and 2 Canadian divisional sets were sent and the GHQ instruction regarding the 1 Canadian divisional set was either omitted or not required. The latter is the most likely as the original instruction to send the wireless sets to Second Army asked for 'two Canadian Divisional Wireless Sets'.[54] The Director of Second Army Signals war diary does record receipt of two wireless sets from First Army but erroneously gives the date of receipt as the 25 July, which is two days before the initial instruction from GHQ was sent out.[55] Further weight is added to the wireless sets being from both the 1 and 2 Divisional Signal Companies as both of their war diaries make specific reference to X Corps on consecutive days. Although the diary of the 2 Divisional Signal Company does not make reference to a wireless set being dispatched it does record that a visit was made to X Corps on 29 July by its commanding officer as well as one other officer.[56]

The final inaccuracy with regard to the movement of the Canadian divisional wireless sets and their operators concerns what happened to them after arrival in Second Army. Daniel Dancocks suggests that they were assigned to Sydney Lawford's 41 Division but examination of that division's war diary reveals that it was American and not Canadian wireless personnel that were attached to that division on 29 July.[57] Evidence in support of these men being American is compelling due to the fact that the Second Army war diary records four battalions of American infantry beginning their attachment to 41 Division and 6 Division on 26 July.[58] Furthermore 41 Division was allocated to XIX Corps and not X Corps. As neither the X Corps war diaries nor its associated divisional war diaries contain any reference to the Canadians and their wireless sets, their attachment within Second Army remains a point of conjecture. Once established with Second Army it is not entirely clear what messages the Canadians sent, to whom they were sent and in what format they were sent. Regarding the latter, once again there is an ambiguity as Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie, GOC Canadian Corps, wrote that the messages were sent 'worded so as to permit the enemy to decipher the identity of the senders' whereas an after action report draft narrative states they were sent 'in clear'.[59] The latter would probably have raised too much suspicion, as the Germans were well aware that the BEF only sent messages in clear in emergencies.[60] One of the most likely methods that could have been used by the Canadian signallers to allow their identity to be discovered would have been to have reverted back to the insecure call sign system that had been replaced in First Army in May 1918. This system identified a formation by three letters such that the letters "AUO" would represent the Australian Corps and the "CAO" the Canadian Corps.[61] In addition, it would have been possible for the Germans to identify these units by the wavelength they employed. This had been recognised by GHQ by 5 August 1918 who were working on a system to allot new wavelengths although this was not done in time for the battle.[62]

The tank wireless sets were supplied by the 1 Tank Brigade Signal Company, whose war diary records that on 1 August 'Lt Mainprize and 10 OR's were sent for special wireless duty in Second Army area'.[63] Despite the fact that these men were performing this 'special duty' for nine days before returning to their unit very little information is available regarding the exact nature of their work. The British Official History simply records that 'great activity was exhibited by the wireless stations of First and Second Army on the tank wavelength which was well known to the Germans'.[64]

As the orders in Second Army area were being enacted a simultaneous plan was being put into effect on the front of First Army in the region of Arras.

Diagram 1.2: The Arras plan

The instructions contained in the Annexure to O.A.D 900/1 regarding this part of the deception plan read:

Every effort will be made by the First Army to foster the belief, which appears to exist, that an attack is imminent in the ARRAS sector.[65]

To assist this effort, on 27 July the First Army was instructed to make arrangements for one cavalry wireless set to be operated behind the Arras front.[66] Additionally, the wireless sets of the reserve divisions of First Army, together with those of the Second and Third Armies, were instructed to be setup and operated behind their respective fronts whilst wireless activity on all other fronts was ordered to cease.[67] The cavalry orders were changed on 30 July when instructions were given that only in the event of a relocation of the Cavalry Corps headquarters would the Corps wireless station be moved to First Army area.[68] Despite these instructions they were never implemented and instead the Cavalry Corps wireless duty station was simply dismantled under orders from GHQ and did not begin operating again until 2.30 a.m. on the morning of 8 August.[69] This change is probably due to GHQ realising that a silent wireless station could be just as useful as a dummy station with respect to the falsification of signals traffic. Two other activities were taking place within First Army front to complete the deception plan on this front. Firstly, a tank battalion was instructed to carry out manoeuvres in broad daylight as if in preparation for an attack, and secondly, Currie was busying himself with false plans for a feint in the Orange Hill area near Arras. This feint was first proposed by Currie at a conference with Rawlinson on 21 July and was as much about convincing Canadian troops of an impending attack as it was about convincing the Germans.[70] The next day, on the 22 July, he outlined the dummy plans to his divisional commanders and, according to the Canadian Corps CBSO, Lt. Colonel Andrew Macnaughton, gave a very convincing performance.[71]

Finally, a series of general security measures were implemented prior to the opening of the offensive on 8 August these were designed to maximise the element of surprise. They included dispensing with the preliminary barrage and instead relying on accurate survey techniques and the mass use of tanks, the engine noise of which being cloaked by low flying aircraft, minimising unusual activity near the front line and pasting a notice in the men's pay books ordering them to 'keep their mouth's shut'.[72] Even the lie of the country favoured a surprise attack with its covered approaches.[73]

Diagram 1.3: The general secrecy measures at Amiens

Additionally, in July 1918, the wireless security measures adopted by the British Armies in France were revised and improved. The improvements involved the use of 'silent days' and an overhaul of the wireless call signs used by all formations. A 'silent day' was usually a 12-24 hour period within which the use of field telephones, power buzzers and wireless was strictly forbidden. It was well known that any abnormal communications silence or activity, particularly with respect to wireless was a 'sure sign' that an offensive was impending.[74] Silent days were therefore an attempt to obfuscate the conclusions that would otherwise be drawn from listening in to the BEF's signals activity. John Ferris suggests that these periods of silence were random but it seems much more likely that they were deliberately planned, particularly with respect Amiens.[75] For example, the war diary of 30 Division records only three silent days for the whole of 1918 and these occurred on 24 July, 1 August and 10 August. The 30 Division was part of X Corps during this period and although there is no record of silent days in that formation's war diary a wireless operator in 30 Division confided to his personal diary that 24 July was a 'silent day for the corps'.[76] It would therefore seem probable that 1 and 10 August would also have applied to the whole corps. The three silent dates fall just before, and during the Battle of Amiens, and given that X Corps were located within Second Army, who were the hosts of a wireless deception plan with respect to the Canadian Corps, this would seem to suggest that these days were part of a carefully orchestrated plan.

In addition to the silent days the system of calls signs underwent a radical change beginning in May 1918 when, according to a captured German document, four letter codes were introduced to identify units.[77] This same document also states that the Germans had succeeded in penetrating this system by July 1918 after which call signs were changed daily these statements are quoted by John Ferris in his 1988 journal article.[78] A significant proportion of Ferris's article is based on this document, however the latter is fundamentally flawed for two reasons. First, what happened in May was not the introduction of four letter codes but rather the frequency of change became daily instead of bi-monthly, and second, in July it was not the daily change that was introduced but a much higher level of security through encryption of the call signs.[79] As a result, the statement that the Germans succeeded in 'penetrating this system' lacks credibility, as the system they claimed to penetrate was not the one in existence.[80] The conclusion that the Germans were not successful in penetrating the system of daily call sign changes is supported by another translated document, dated 1 August, from the German 51 Corps that noted 'a striking improvement has lately taken place in the telephone and wireless discipline of our enemies'.[81] This general tightening of wireless signals security ultimately helped facilitate the element of surprise at Amiens. How effective though were the other wireless deception measures at Kemmel and Arras and did they also succeed in their objective?

According to Sir Arthur Currie, when the offensive at Amiens was launched on 8 August the surprise was 'complete and overwhelming'.[82] Prisoners from four separate divisions, captured by the Australians early on 8 August, also stated that the attack had been a 'complete surprise'.[83] This is not entirely true as a number of prisoners captured on 8 August testified that two factors had led them to believe that an attack was expected, although not imminent these factors were an increase in air activity and movement behind the lines.[84] The latter had been a concern of 2 Canadian Division who, prior to the battle reported:

. a very large movement by day of heavy artillery and ammunition lorries. Although the visibility from the air was poor, it was certain that some of this movement was observed by the enemy.[85]

In addition, on 4 August the German Oberste-Heeresleitung reported that two Canadian divisions previously on the Arras front had been replaced and that this required particular attention to be paid to the fronts of the British Third and Fourth Armies.[86] A certain amount of suspicion was also raised by the communications silence that had preceded the attack.[87] It is interesting that no mention was made of the British Second Army front despite the fact that the Germans had established the presence of Canadian troops in Flanders.[88] The Australian Official History states that it was only the presence of Canadian Wireless and not infantry that was detected in Flanders, although the source of this assertion is unclear.[89] Ernst Kabisch states that both the presence of the two Canadian battalions and their wireless sets were detected, as does the German Official History.[90] Despite this the German Army staff did not update their situation maps, which, on the morning of 8 August, still showed the four Canadian divisions, clustered around Arras.[91] It is unlikely that this was as a result of the Orange Hill feint, it is probably more the result of incomplete intelligence confirming that the entire divisions had moved. The result of all of this uncertainty was that the German staff were confused, but not convinced enough by the deception plans to change their troop dispositions.[92] However, the uncertainty combined with the other secrecy measures was enough to give the offensive at Amiens a high degree of surprise, even if that surprise was not total. Prior and Wilson argue that the deception plans served only one purpose and that was that the Germans did not move their artillery positions.[93] They also argue that not enough time would have been available to improve the poor state of the defences and adding more troops to the front line would simply have increased the number of casualties.[94] Regarding the first point, the Germans did actually move their artillery positions back eight days before the battle as a direct result of the Australian raid on 29 July.[95] This made very little difference as 95 per cent of the German guns were still located prior to the battle.[96] The latter point regarding adding of troops is somewhat moot as the Germans would have been more likely to bring in Eingreif divisions as their defensive doctrine was based on elastic defence in depth which called for a weakly held front line and counter attack troops in the rear.[97]

Two Canadian authors have opined that the deception plans were a major factor in the success on 8 August.[98] These plans do appear to have at least confused the Canadian troops according to an entry in Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig's diary dated 7 August, which reads:

The move of some Canadian battalions and casualty clearing stations to our Second Army front seems to have quite misled the Canadian troops and many spoke of the "coming offensive to retake Kemmel"![99]

The evidence suggests though that the Germans were more confused than deceived by these plans. The wireless stations in Flanders do seem to have come to the attention of the Germans, even more so than the two infantry battalions according to the Australian Official History, which suggests that wireless did make a significant contribution to this confusion. Other wireless security measures such as the new system of wireless call signs, the introduction of wireless 'silent days' and instructions to the Canadian Corps not to open wireless stations before zero simply added to this confusion.[100] The result was that German intelligence did not detect the relocation of the Canadian Corps from Arras to Amiens.[101] This was the decisive factor in the surprise at Amiens.

Chapter 2

The use of wireless with the ground forces

This chapter will discuss the extent to which wireless was used by the ground forces during the Battle of Amiens. In order to facilitate this discussion, two questions will be posed namely did the Dominion divisions use wireless to a greater extent than the Imperial divisions and how did the use of wireless as a communications medium compare with other forms of communication during the battle?

The official signals policy that applied at the Battle of Amiens was laid down eight months before in the training pamphlet S.S 191.[102] This recommended that in the case of a move from static to open warfare each advancing division should make use of 'as many means of transmission as circumstances will admit'.[103] It was recognised that it would not always be possible to connect divisional communication routes by telephone and therefore suggested a number of alternatives such as visual signalling, portable wireless sets, mounted orderlies and message carrying rockets.[104] Emphasis was placed on restoring telephone communications as soon as possible. Wireless though was a new science and, as John Terraine observed, was not a habit carried over from civilian life.[105] This made the staff reluctant to adopt wireless, despite the official endorsement in the training pamphlets in addition, the certainty of buried telephone cables in static conditions had created an air of complacency. Since 1 April 1916 orders had been issued that cable must be buried to a minimum depth of six feet in order to ensure immunity from a 5.9-inch shell.[106] This reluctance persisted up to the Battle of Amiens as evidenced by an after action report from the 4 Canadian Signal Division:

In stationary trench warfare seven foot buried cable has made the telephone service so certain that all other methods of communication have become superfluous and it is only the keenest optimism that has maintained the efficiency of such alternatives as wireless, visual and cable wagons.[107]

Attempts had been made, during the early summer months, to encourage the use of visual signalling and wireless by the use of what became known as 'silent days'.[108] These days were the complete antithesis of those mentioned in the previous chapter in so far as they only allowed the use of wireless and visual, the use of the telephone and telegraph being strictly forbidden. Unfortunately these days were not always successful as recorded by an artillery officer in the 1 Canadian Divisional Artillery.[109] There were also significant inherent problems with wireless. These included a lack of trained operators, susceptibility to jamming, heavy weight of sets, conspicuous aerials and the problem of enciphering and deciphering each message.[110] Despite these problems wireless technology was improving rapidly in 1918 and this resulted in greater confidence in the medium. For instance the 1917 pattern 'spark' trench set, which became available in large numbers in 1918, was capable of transmitting on 16 wavelengths instead of just two.[111] A Canadian Corps wireless intelligence report suggests that by August 1918 the BEF's wireless technology was one year ahead of the Germans who had been suffering from material shortages.[112]

However, the use of wireless at corps, division and brigade level varied tremendously at Amiens as shown in the table below.

Table 2.1: The use of wireless between infantry formations


BATTLE OF AMIENS 1918, and Operations 8th August-3rd Sept 1918.

BATTLE OF AMIENS 1918, and Operations 8th August-3rd September, 1918.' by Lt Col Kearsey.

First published in 1950 this book is a reprint of that edition. This is one of a series of studies on campaigns and battles of the Great War by Lt Col Kearsey, designed to help the student of military history, particularly those studying for Staff College. Sub-titled
‘The Turn of the Tide on the Western Front' the book examines the offensive
that marked the beginning of the end for Germany.

The Australians with their Canadian comrades, launched on the 8 August 1918, the Battle of Amiens the great offensive that was to bring the war to a victorious end.

Setting out from the positions of Villers-Bretonneux and Hamel, the Australian troops in two hours had accomplished all their objectives, and the Canadian troops who had begun
the attack alongside them had advanced several kilometres. In just over 3 hours,
the enemy's front line had been overrun. In total, the Allied forces captured
29,144 prisoners, 338 guns, and liberated 116 towns and villages. Ludendorff,
the German commander, famously called the 8th August "the black day of the German
Army"


Australian infantry move forward

Australian infantry and pioneers move forward on 8 August 1918. The foggy conditions, which helped the attackers to surprise the Germans, are very obvious and the cameraman noted “the foggy weather made it impossible to get a connected story of good quality film”.

These, together with the British III Corps, were supported by more than 2,000 guns from the Royal Artillery, over 500 tanks from the Tank Corps and over 1,900 aircraft from the Royal Air Force and its French equivalent.


Battle of Amiens, August 10, 1918

Saturday We were up this a.m. at 5 o’c and moved about 12 miles up the line tis a great day am well, (11:20 a.m.) After a forced march this a.m. we pulled into action after a hurried lunch about 400 yds from the front line After an advance of 12 miles we were stopped by machine gun nest


Today’s reports are not particularly consistent, but the general outline is clear. At 1:30 this morning the 5 th Canadian Divisional Artillery is ordered forward in support of an attack by the 32 nd Division, (1) a British division which has been attached since yesterday to the Canadian Corps and is about to move forward to take the place of the 3 rd Canadian Division. (2) The 32 nd ’s artillery have been delayed because of German bombing last night. (2) The brigade leaves its camp near Dromart at dawn to be in a positions of readiness near Beaufort by late morning Percy has enough time to jot in his diary after a hurried lunch they go into action “on the run, kits and equipment flying in all directions.” (3) They are close to the front lines, too close, in fact, within machine-gun range, and only 700 yards behind the front-line infantry. Since the infantry are being held up by those machine guns, the battery retires to a position beside a stretch of disused trench, to the east of Folies. (3,1)

Why this happened is unclear: The 13 th Brigade officers say they were too close because they received wrong information from the 32 nd Division (1) much later, Nicholson, Canada’s official historian of the Great War, says that “by some misfortune the 32 nd Division jumped off a mile or more short of its assigned start line.” (4) In other words, the Canadians were where they were supposed to be the British weren’t.

I’ll quote again from the 43 rd Battery History: “So you will see that we are not qualified to give the military details of these operations and it remains only to discourse a little concerning the way in which the … fighting affected us, ‘who never could know and could never understand.”’ (5)

Generally the problem, when the infantry are moving quickly (13 km the first day another 6 yesterday), is getting the guns close enough to provide effective cover and wire-cutting. Today, the third day of the Battle of Amiens, the advance is slowing as German resistance is stronger: reinforcements are arriving – four fresh German divisions opposite the Canadians – with replacement guns and deadly machine guns. (6)

And they are now facing each other across land that shows the scars of much earlier fighting, “a belt some three miles wide pitted with shell-holes and the remains of old trenches, and befouled with tangles of rusty barbed wire overgrown with long, concealing grass. There was no lack of good sites for machine-gun posts, and the attackers were quickly to realize that the operation had suddenly reverted from open pursuit almost to the former pattern of trench warfare.” (4)

The infantry are attacking Le Quesnoy, Parvillers and Damery, and make some progress in the morning, but by the afternoon they are stalled, “stopped by machine-gun nest” says Percy. “Nest” is such a cosy word, but we must think of wasps rather than fledglings.

“The villages were alive with machine-gun nests which were used to deadly effect on the allied troops.” (7) The 5 th CDA guns will remain in action all night. (8)

***
The photograph © IWM (Q 9334) shows Canadian 18 pounders going forward. It will be taken about seven weeks from now.

The first map (from the McMaster University Digital Collection) shows Beaufort (A) where the 13th Brigade gathered in readiness, Folies (B) east of which they took up firing positions, and Parvillers-Daméry which are the infantry’s objectives. The second map (from the Canadian War Museum) indicates with purple dots where these locations are in reference to the territory we have been covering since the early morning of August 8th — a long way from that first position near Cachy and from last night’s near Dromart (also marked).


5. The battle was the start of the Hundred Day Offensive, which led to the end of the First World War.

American soldiers on their way to the Hindenburg Line.

After the Battle of Amiens, a fresh offensive began in Albert on August 21 st that ultimately pushed the Germans back 55km. On August 27 th Phillip Gibbs, a British war correspondent stated that the Germany ‘is on the defensive’ and credited Amiens with a change in the morale of the Allied troops, saying the army was geared up with ‘enormous hope.’

Then the Germans were pushed back to the Hindenburg Line, a major defensive point of theirs constructed in the Winter of 1916-1917, and a series of battles were held there before the British army broke through on October 8 th . It was this breach that forced German commanders to face up to the fact that the war had to end. Towards the end of 1918, they retreated through territories they had gained in 1914, and fighting took place up until 11 am on November 11 th , 1918 when the Armistice took effect.

The Hundred Days Offensive saw the tides of fortune turn against Germany in the First World War. From there the fate of the German Army was sealed. After the Battle of Amiens, it was only a matter of time before the war would be over, with Germany on the losing side.


Tonton videonya: Battle of Amiens 8-12 August 1918 - British Empire vs Germany (Oktober 2021).